“Defendants do not dispute that Section 2 creates rights, and that the violation of those rights creates an Article III injury.  Rather, they suggest, for the first time, that Section 2 is inapplicable here.  For example, they misinterpret 42 U.S.C. § 1973(l)(c)(1), suggesting that it limits the reach of Section 2, instead of expanding it.  Resp. 7-8.  Section 1973(a) (Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act) is a stand-alone provision; it does not extend only to the examples contained in Section 1973(l)(c)(1).  See e.g., United States v. Brown, 494 F. Supp. 2d 440, 454 (S.D.Miss.2007) (Section 2 violation when candidate Walker treated unfairly in defendant’s home during intra-party dispute about challenge to placement of opposing candidate on ballot.).

            Even if defendants were correct that Section 1971(l)(c)(1) is an exhaustive list of those matters that can violate Section 2, the appearance of the word “proposition” adequately describes the plebiscite in the common usage of the term as it applies to elections where an issue or question is submitted broadly to the electorate.  E.g., Tigrett v. Cooper, 2012 WL 691892, *20-21 (W.D. Tenn. March 2, 2012); Armstrong v. Allain, 893 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (S.D. Miss. 1994).    
        Defendants also quip that Guam “could not have been further from Congress’ mind” when it enacted Section 2 in 1965.   Resp.11.  Courts have squarely rejected such racially selective application of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act just because the victims of discrimination are not traditional racial minorities.   Brown, 494 F. Supp. 2d at 444. (“Section 2 provides no less protection to white voters than any other class of voters.  Any doubt as to this conclusion is allayed by a review of the history of Section 2.”).  One matter perhaps further from the mind of Congress in 1965 than Guam was the plight of white Mississippians.      
        Nevertheless, Section 2 protects everyone equally, even if defendants prefer that a diluted version be applied in Guam. Defendants correctly note that plaintiff does not cite any authority for the proposition that Section 2 prohibits a government sponsored and government-run registration system to poll only one race of voters in an election.  Resp. 7, n.5.  Plaintiff cites no authority for this proposition because no state has been so brazen since 1965 as to enact such a nakedly discriminatory law.  After the Voting Rights Act passed 1965, and after the bloodshed that characterized the fight over the right merely to register, states forever abandoned any laws even resembling such an illegal registration scheme. 

        Finally, and more broadly, defendants repeatedly imply that this Court should dilute civil rights protections because Guam is a mere territory and groups would be slighted if plaintiff prevails.  Defendants advance a “fundamental difference between citizenship unilaterally conferred upon residents of unincorporated territories and citizenship obtained by mutual consent.”  Resp.12.

        But defendants cite no authority that the statutes at issue in this case, including the Voting Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1971, and the Fifteenth Amendment do not apply with equal strength in Guam as they do in Ohio or Georgia.  The defendants might prefer that these statutes be diluted when they are applied in Guam, but doing so would be error.  Neither may grievances about the decisions made by Congress in 1950 masquerade as an affirmative defense to modern race discrimination.”