Campaign finance law has indeed become a bewildering array of arcane, seemingly arbitrary distinctions and lines. In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, I was one of a group of former FEC commissioners who attempted, in an amicus brief, to impress on the court the exceedingly complex nature of the law. Among other things, we noted that campaign finance regulations imposed unique rules on 71 different types of speakers, for 33 different types of campaign-related speech.

Much of this complexity has come about from the interplay of courts and regulators (by whom I mean not only those in government who do the regulating, but the substantial complex of lobbying organizations and foundations that promote further regulation of campaign speech). Regulators pass laws that are so broad as to offend most any normal interpretation of the First Amendment. The Courts attempt to confine those laws to a limited space, leaving ample alternative avenues for free speech. The regulators then pass laws attempting to block off those alternative avenues, and another go around begins.